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Abstract
Due Process hearing rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act are
under attack. A major professional group and several academic commentators charge that the
hearings system advantages middle class parents, that it is expensive, that it is futile, and that it
is unmanageable. Some critics would abandon individual rights to a hearing and review in favor
of bureaucratic enforcement or administrative mechanisms that do not include the right to an
individual hearing before a neutral decision maker.
This Article defends the right to a due process hearing. It contends that some criticisms of
hearing rights are simply erroneous, and that others are overstated. The system is generally fair
to the various classes of parents, even if some parents are better able than others to use it
effectively. Costs are remarkably low given the number of children receiving special education,
and hearings and hearing requests have been in decline for years. Far from being futile, the due
process hearing system is one in which parents win a significant percentage of cases. And far
from being out of control, hearings are generally being managed effectively. The system could be
rendered still more efficient with a few modest reforms of the special education statute and its
interpretation.
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In Defense of IDEA Due Process
Due Process hearing rights afforded by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 1
are under attack. A major professional group and several academic commentators complain that
the hearings system unfairly advantages middle class parents, that it is unduly expensive, that it
is futile, and that it has gone out of control. 2 Critics would abandon the system in favor of
government enforcement or various forms of review of decisions about special education
decisions that do not include the right to an individual hearing before a neutral decision maker. 3
This Article defends the right to a due process hearing. It contends that some criticisms of
hearing rights are flat-out wrong, and that others are badly overblown. The system is, on the
whole, fair to the various classes of parents, even if some parents are better able than others to
use it effectively. 4 Costs are remarkably low given the number of children enrolled in special
education, and the numbers of hearings and hearing requests have been in decline for years. 5 Far
from being futile, the due process hearing system is one in which parents prevail in a significant
number of cases. 6 And far from being out of control, hearings are being managed effectively;
moreover the system could be rendered still more efficient with a few modest reforms of the
special education statute and its interpretation. 7
Special education matters to millions of children who otherwise would not be effectively
served by public education. 8 Due process hearing rights are needed to protect children’s vital

1

20 U.S.C. §§ 14000-1482 (2006) ( IDEA)..
See infra text accompanying notes ___ [AASA & academics].
3
See infra text accompanying notes ___ [AASA & Pasachoff reforms].
4
See infra text accompanying notes ___ [response to challenges].
5
See infra text accompanying notes ___ [GAO report, etc.].
6
See infra text accompanying notes ___ [Parents never win anyway].
7
See infra text accompanying notes ___ [describing criticisms].
8
See infra text accompanying notes ___ (describing state of education for children with disabilities before Congress
established rights parents could enforce).
2
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right to a meaningful education. This Article outlines the case in favor of IDEA due process
rights. Part I gives a brief background on IDEA and the due process hearing rights the statute
affords parents of children with disabilities. Part II details the charges that have been leveled
against the existing due process system. Part III presents the defense, arguing that the system is
fair and not overly costly, that it affords ample opportunities for success to parents, and that it
operates well within manageable bounds. Part IV explores the sometimes unrecognized benefits
of the due process system in protecting important educational interests from arbitrary decision
making and in building up a body of special education law precedent. Part V explores the
drawbacks of some of the alternatives that have been put forward to replace due process. Finally,
Part VI offers a few modest reforms that could make the due process hearing system more
efficient.
I. IDEA AND IDEA DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires states that receive federal
special education funding to provide a free, appropriate public education to all children with
disabilities within their jurisdiction. 9 Participating states and local school districts must provide
appropriate educational programs, and must also furnish services related to education, such as
transportation, speech therapy, sign language interpretation, and school nursing. 10 The law
requires that children with disabilities be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, with
children who do not have disabilities, and that school districts afford children with disabilities
the supplementary aids and services needed to prevent them from being removed from regular
classes. 11

9

See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(i) (2006) (authorizing appropriations).
Id. § 1401(26) (defining “related services”).
11
Id. § 1412(a)(5).
10
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Parents of children with disabilities have rights to notice and consent and the right to
participate in the creation of their child’s individualized education program (IEP). The IEP
document sets out the services that the school district commits itself to deliver to the child. 12 It
contains a statement of the child’s current levels of academic achievement and functional
performance; a list of measurable annual goals, both functional and academic; a description of
how the child’s progress toward meeting the annual goals will be measured; an elaboration of the
special education and related services and supplementary services to be provided; an explanation
of the child’s participation with nondisabled children in regular classes; a list of accommodations
needed by the child on state and district assessments; and several other terms. 13
Parents may challenge the program or placement that the school district offers by
demanding an adversarial “due process hearing,” and they or the school district may appeal the
result of the hearing to court. 14 At the due process hearing, the parent and the school district have
the right to be accompanied and advised by an attorney, to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses, and to compel the attendance of witnesses. 15 They have the right to a written
transcript, and to a written document including the findings of fact and decision. 16 The hearing
officer must not be an employee of the state educational agency or the school district involved in
the child’s education, must not have a professional or personal interest that conflicts with the
objectivity, and must have the knowledge and ability to understand the law, conduct the hearing,
12

See id. § 1414(d).
Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
14
Id. § 1415(f)-(i). School districts may also invoke the due process hearing procedure, and are prone to do so if, for
example, the parents refuse to consent to a child’s initial evaluation for special education eligibility. See §
1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I). States may create a state-level hearing review procedure that must be exhausted before the
matter goes to court. § 1415(g). The child remains in the existing placement during the pendency of proceedings. §
1415(j). Attorneys’ fees are available to parents if they are successful, § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(F), and to prevailing state
educational agencies and school districts in limited circumstances if the parents’ hearing request is frivolous or for
an improper purpose, § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III). The law also provides rights to challenge long-term suspensions,
expulsions, or other removals from school imposed on children with disabilities. § 1415(k).
15
§ 1415(h)(1)-(2).
16
§ 1415(h)(3)-(4).
13
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and render and write the decision. 17 In all but rare circumstances, the parents have the right to
keep the child in the current educational placement pending the outcome of the hearing and
appeals. 18
The guarantee to each child with a disability of the right to a free, appropriate education,
and the guarantee to parents of procedural rights that include a face-to-face hearing in front of a
neutral decision maker were key features of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children
Act. 19 The participation and hearing rights manifested a “congressional emphasis” on the
individual ability of parents to enforce the law’s underlying obligations. 20 Two federal cases that
influenced Congress in its drafting of the law had upheld procedural due process claims against
exclusion of children with disabling conditions from public school as well as equal protection
claims over the denial of appropriate educational services. 21
Parents of children with disabilities spent years courting political allies to secure passage
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, with its guarantee of appropriate education
and procedural protections. 22 Although some states and local school districts served children
with disabilities and received limited federal special education reimbursement, before passage of
the 1975 Act approximately 1.75 million children with disabilities were excluded from public
school altogether and another 2.5 million were in programs that did not meet their needs. 23 In
1990, Congress renamed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act the Individuals with
17

§ 1415(f)(3)(A).
§ 1415(j). But see § 1415(k)(4) (providing exception for certain school disciplinary matters).
19
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3(c), 89 Stat. 773, 773.
20
See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 476 U.S. 176, 205-206 (1982).
21
Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania,
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The Supreme Court commented on the
importance of these cases to the formation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in Rowley. 458 U.S.
at 192-94.
22
See ROBERTA WEINER & MAGGIE HUME, . . . AND EDUCATION FOR ALL: PUBLIC POLICY AND HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN 14-21 (2d ed. 1987).
23
H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975).
18
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Disabilities Education Act, and that is the name the law has today. 24 The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 embodies the most recent set of amendments. 25
The Supreme Court’s one foray into interpreting the appropriate education duty is Board
of Education v. Rowley, a 1982 case in which the Court held that appropriate education means
services sufficient to provide “some educational benefit” to a child with a disability. 26 Services
must be beneficial 27 so that access to education is meaningful. 28 But the Court said that the
congressional objective was “more to open the door of public education to handicapped children
on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.” 29 Schools
had to provide a “floor of opportunity” that would give “access to specialized instruction and
related services.” 30
The Court at the same time stressed the importance of the procedural rights, including
hearing rights, that the special education law provides:

24

Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103. Over time, the
term “handicapped” became disfavored, and many favored placing the person first and the description of disability
second, to emphasize that a person with a disability is a human being rather than a manifestation of an impairment.
See Illinois Attorney General, Disability Rights: Manual of Style for Depicting People with Disabilities, available at
http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manualstyle.html (visited Feb. 19, 2014).
25
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006)). See generally Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7 (2006) (describing and commenting on
2004 Reauthorization).
26
458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
27
Id. at 200-01.
28
Id. at 192. The Court said there must be “personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the
child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Id. at 203.
29
Id. at 192.
30
Id. at 201. The Court applied this some-benefit definition of appropriate education to reverse a holding that a firstgrade student who was deaf but had lipreading skills and a hearing aid was entitled to a sign language interpreter
even though she achieved satisfactory grades and passed from grade to grade without interpretation services. Id. at
209-10. The Court said, “We do not attempt to establish a single test for determining the adequacy of educational
benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act,” id. at 202, but indicated that if a child is advancing from
grade to grade in regular education classrooms the standard is likely to be met, id. at 203-04 & n.25. The Court
rejected a standard used by the lower courts in the case that a child must be provided services sufficient to maximize
her potential commensurate with the opportunity provided children without disabilities to maximize their potentials.
Id. at 198.
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When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in § 1415
are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions
contained in the Act, we think that the importance Congress attached to these
procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. It seems to us no exaggeration to say
that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with
procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every
stage of the administrative process, as it did upon the measurement of the
resulting IEP against a substantive standard. 31
Additional decisions from the Supreme Court interpreting the special education law place
further emphasis on procedural rights. In Honig v. Doe, the Court noted that before passage of
the 1975 Act, “Congress’ earlier efforts to ensure that disabled students received adequate public
education had failed in part because the measures it adopted were largely hortatory”; 32 the Court
upheld the parents’ enforceable right to keep a child with disabilities who had been excluded
from school for disciplinary violations to remain in the current educational placement pending a
due process hearing challenging the child’s removal. 33 In a 2007 case, the Court ruled that
31

Id. at 205-06 (citation omitted). The Court also noted that one of the two constitutional right to education cases
that most influenced Congress in drafting the Act required the public school system to afford a hearing before an
independent hearing officer, to permit attorney representation at the hearing, and provide a right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 194 n.20 (citing Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 879-881(D.D.C.
1972)). The other required the defendant to hold a hearing on any change in a child’s educational assignment. Id.
(citing PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1971)) .
32
484 U.S. 305, 310 n.1 (1988), superseded in part by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4).
33
Id. at 323-26. As it had in Rowley, the Court stressed the importance of procedural rights, including the right to a
due process hearing:
Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance and indeed the necessity of
parental participation in both the development of the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its
effectiveness. Accordingly, the Act establishes various procedural safeguards that guarantee
parents both an opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education
and the right to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate. These safeguards include
the right to examine all relevant records pertaining to the identification, evaluation, and
educational placement of their child; prior written notice whenever the responsible educational
agency proposes (or refuses) to change the child's placement or program; an opportunity to present
complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency's provision of a free appropriate public
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parents could enforce the law by going to court to challenge the outcome of the due process
hearing without an attorney, even though in other contexts they would need a lawyer to proceed
in court on their child’s behalf. 34 In affirming this further ability to challenge the decisions of the
public schools, the Court stressed that IDEA gives parents independent, enforceable rights that
are both procedural and substantive, 35 and that “[t]he statute's procedural and reimbursementrelated rights are intertwined with the substantive adequacy of the education provided to a child .
. . .” 36
II. CHALLENGES TO IDEA DUE PROCESS HEARING RIGHTS
The due process hearing rights that Congress established nearly forty years ago are now
under attack. A recent report of the American Association of School Administrators (AASA)
argues that “modifications to the current due process system could greatly reduce, if not
eliminate, the burdensome and often costly litigation that does not necessarily ensure
measureable educational gains for special education students.” 37 These “modifications” consist
of abolishing the due process hearing system, which the AASA contends is unnecessary, hard for
low- and middle-income parents to use, and bothersome to public school staffs, 38 frequently

education; and an opportunity for “an impartial due process hearing” with respect to any such
complaints.
Id. at 311-312 (citations omitted).
34
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
35
Id. at 531 (“IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only in the
procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the substantive decisions to be made.”).
36
Id. at 531-32.
37
Sasha Pudelski, American Association of School Administrators, Rethinking Special Education Due Process 2
(April, 2013),
http://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/Public_Policy_Resources/Special_Education/AASARethi
nkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf.
38
Id. at 3, 6-9.
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causing them to accede to parental requests they consider unreasonable 39 and imposing stress on
personnel 40 and legal expenses on school districts. 41
Criticism comes not merely from the targets of due process hearing requests, who might
be expected to complain, but from academic sources as well. Professor Pasachoff criticizes the
IDEA due process and appeals system as a private enforcement mechanism, which, she says, in a
non-means-tested entitlement program, leads to enforcement disparities and resource allocation
distortions between rich and poor that public enforcement—monitoring and the like—may
avoid. 42 That view is perhaps reinforced by stories in Professor Colker’s recent book about
special education that portray poor parents as unable to succeed in exercising due process rights,
while describing better-off families who prevail. 43 The AASA narrative also gains support from
seemingly offhand comments disparaging individual IDEA litigation in one of the articles in a
Journal of Law and Education symposium on the thirtieth anniversary of the Rowley case. 44 A
student note in last year’s Journal of Law and Education also attacks the due process system as
unfair and calls for a replacement, though it does not say what that ought to be. 45 Finally,
Professor Rosenfeld has proposed voluntary binding arbitration as an alternative to due process

39

Id. at 10-12.
Id. at 12-13.
41
Id. at 13-14
42
Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1413, 1416 (2012) (“If beneficiaries with fewer financial resources consistently bring fewer claims than their
wealthier counterparts, relying heavily on private enforcement may mean that the former group will not receive their
fair share of the distribution. Reliance on private enforcement will thus unintentionally undercut the statute's
substantive goals.”).
43
See RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION 4-5, 153-60, 169-72, 184-87 (2013)
44
Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Is No Longer Good Enough: How the High Stakes Nature
of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley Definition of a Free, Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L.
& EDUC. 5, 22 (2012).
45
Cali Cope-Kasten, Note, Bidding (Fair)Well to Due Process: The Need for a Fairer Final Stage in Special
Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 501 (2013).The note was the George Jay Joseph Education Law
Writing Award winner.
40
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for parties who choose it, and recently published a major article in support of the proposal. 46 The
House bill that became IDEA’s reauthorization in 2004 included binding arbitration, 47 though
the measure did not appear in the version of the bill that passed. 48
III. CRITIQUES AND RESPONSES
Diverse objections are raised by the AASA, by the academic commentators, and,
undoubtedly, by others. The system is said to reward parents who have more resources and to
distort allocations of public educational services. The system is challenged as being too costly.
Affording hearing rights is futile because, supposedly, parents rarely win. Even some authorities
who generally support due process hearing rights think that due process, as practiced, has gotten
out of control. Each of these contentions deserves an answer.
1. Does the system unfairly advantage parents with resources? The proper response here
is confession and avoidance. Yes, the system works better for those with the financial power and
temerity to use it effectively. That will tend to be parents who are middle class and above or who
have educational or professional expertise. But this should hardly be a surprise. The “haves”
come out ahead in the legal system generally, and Professor Galanter’s classic discussion of the
mechanisms by which they do suggests that the result is all but inevitable. 49 In an economic
system that permits inequality of resources, those who are better off will be able to afford better
access to advocacy services just as they can afford better shelter, better nutrition, better clothing,
better medical care, and better everything else. But that does not mean that the opportunities for
46

S. James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 544 (2012). President Bush’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education made a proposal to allow
for binding arbitration in 2002. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, A NEW ERA:
REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 35 (2002).
47
H.R. 1350, 108th Cong. § 205 (2003).
48
See generally Weber, supra note __ [Fla. 2006] at 32 (contending that Congress was wise in rejecting arbitration
proposal).
49
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 95 (1974).
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advocacy should be taken away, leaving no one with the ability to use the law to assert their
rights. Leveling parents of disabled children down simply levels the educational bureaucracy up.
One must admit that Professor Pasachoff’s position is more nuanced than that discussion
might make it out to be. She takes the view that disparities are morally worse in distribution of
services under a statute like IDEA that does not purport to give more to the wealthy, than
disparities are in other situations. 50 But it is hard to view inequalities as more of a problem with
regard to advocacy over public education services than with they are with criminal justice, 51
which should be equally available to rich and poor, or minimizing one’s taxes, a task for which
the rich have far more resources to spend strategically on lawyers and accountants, than the poor
do. 52 The disparities on educational advocacy are, one would think, much less troubling than
disparities on who serves in the military. 53 It is true, as Professor Pasachoff says, that rich
families are better prepared to deal with retaliation for exercising their hearing rights by exiting
the public school system, 54 but that is hardly a reason to eliminate procedural rights for
everyone. Middle class employees are in a superior position to withstand retaliation if they
complain about discrimination too, but that does not mean Congress should eliminate the right to
50

Pasachoff, supra note __, at 1442 (discussing “moral” consequences of enforcement disparities). But see id. at
1434-35 (“I consider not an abstract, moral question about the appropriate components of the social contract for
children with disabilities, but a narrower question about the distribution of public moneys in the context of a statute
that does not purport to give more to the wealthy.”) (footnote omitted).
51
Notably, Supreme Court cases mandating access to criminal defense for those who are poor do not guarantee
equality of advocacy. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guaranteeing right to counsel in criminal
cases involving imprisonment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring provision of free trial transcript or
alternative means of supporting appeal for indigent defendant).
52
Although the Supreme Court has at times said that due process entails the right to be represented by counsel in a
judicial or administrative proceeding, it has not said that the attorney must be provided for free for people who
cannot afford representation if the case is a civil one. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (holding that
due process rights, including right to pre-termination hearing, apply to general assistance cutoff; stating, “We do not
say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to
retain an attorney if he so desires.”).
53
See ironically U.S. Continues Proud Tradition of Diversity on Front Lines, THE ONION (Mar. 26, 2003),
http://www.theonion.com/articles/us-continues-proud-tradition-of-diversity-on-front,3170/ (“With blacks and
Hispanics comprising more than 60 percent of the Army’s ground forces in Iraq, the U.S. military is continuing its
long, proud tradition of multiculturalism on the front lines of war.”).
54
Pasachoff, supra note __, at 1444.
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file administrative complaints and individual lawsuits over discrimination. 55 Moreover, since
courts will award attorneys’ fees to parents who prevail at IDEA due process hearings, one major
equalizer, an attorney, will often be available to rich and poor. 56
As will be developed at greater length below, another effective leveler is the ripple effect
of successful due process proceedings on all, even when brought by better-resourced parents.
Even Professor Pasachoff acknowledges:
Poor children with disabilities have undoubtedly gained from the self-interested
advocacy of families with more financial resources on the whole—whether in
litigation broadly defining rights under the IDEA, amendments to the statute
setting expansive terms, or generous appropriations decisions—even if in the
particulars of individual cases the positive externalities are minor. 57
In direct response to Professor Pasachoff and a similar argument from the AASA 58 that
the wealthy parents’ successful hearings draw to their children resources that should be spread
among all, it is hardly clear that there is a fixed pot of educational goods and if the better
advocated-for children succeed, the poorer advocated-for will necessarily have less. Due process
is not a zero-sum game, for several reasons. More expensive services are not always what the

55

The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the availability of administrative and judicial remedies for retaliation
against those who complain about employment discrimination. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S.
442 (2008) (upholding retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for complaining about discrimination against coworker); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (upholding claim for retaliation under Title IX
of Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-82 and applicable regulations). See generally Michael J.
Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court? The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917 (2009) (discussing recent
retaliation caselaw).
56
Obviously, one could exaggerate the importance of fees awards, given that they come at the end of the case, and
only when the parents succeed, and there are the well know problems of mootness and the offer of judgment rule
standing in the way. See Mark C. Weber, Litigation Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act After
Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
357 (2004) (discussing difficulties with obtaining attorneys’ fees in special education cases under current law).
Nevertheless, many lawyers in private practice demand little or no retainer from the client when taking IDEA cases.
57
Pasachoff, supra note __, at 1459.
58
Pudelski, supra note __, at 7-8.
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parent asks for—witness the number of cases where the parent wants services in a less restrictive
environment and the school resists, even though the less restrictive placement may be less
costly. 59 When that is not the case, due process decisions upholding private placements may lead
districts to create in-house public school programs that serve a larger group of children, at a
lower per-child cost. 60 Moreover, additional resources are typically available outside the school
district’s immediate budget, for example, in state risk pools for funding education of children
with high needs, 61 if the state establishes the pool and district applies for assistance. 62 Even apart
from risk pools, and depending on a given state’s special education funding mechanism, state
money to a district may increase when the district provides more intense services to one or more
students. 63 Moreover, it is not obvious that all school administrators are eager to play RobinHood-in-Reverse in the way a critic might suggest. 64 Educators have professional integrity and

59

See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007) (denying placement in general education setting for
child with Rett Syndrome); see also Weber, supra note __ [Fla.], at 44-45 (contending that school officials who
oppose less restrictive programs are frequently captives of standardized operating procedure).
60
This phenomenon has happened with regard to highly specialized services for young children with autism. See
Office of Diverse Learner Supports & Services, Chicago Public Schools, Autism Instructional Supports & Services,
http://www.cpsdiverselearner.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1633&Itemid=643 (last visited
Feb. 14, 2014) (describing extensive support services for students with autism, with first consideration to
supplemental aids provided in public school general education classrooms).
61
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(e)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (“For the purpose of assisting local educational agencies . . . in
addressing the needs of high need children with disabilities, each State shall have the option to reserve for each
fiscal year 10 percent of the amount of funds the State reserves for State-level activities under paragraph (2)(A) –
(I) to establish and make disbursements from the high cost fund to local educational agencies in accordance with this
paragraph during the first and succeeding fiscal years of the high cost fund . . . .”).
62
Eve Muller, National Association of State Directors of Special Education, Risk Pools: State Approaches (Apr.
2006), http://nasdse.org/DesktopModules/DNNspot-Store/ProductFiles/178_dea70b21-4c4b-4bb9-84334c92266754a2.pdf (reporting that 30 of 42 state respondents said their states had risk pools before 2004 IDEA
Reauthorization, and that 25 of 30 planned to continue the existing risk pools, with remaining 5 planning to adopt
risk pool arrangement found in new law, and 5 of 12 without risk pools planning to use procedure under new law).
63
See THOMAS PARRISH ET AL., 1 STATE SPECIAL EDUCATION FINANCE SYSTEMS 1999-2000, at 3-11 (2003)
(describing state special education financing systems generally, including those that employ weighting systems for
assumed extra cots of educating children in various disability categories and those that allocate funding based on
teacher and related service personnel counts).
64
See Pasachoff, supra note __, at 1441-42 (“When facing choices among possible programs for a wealthy child and
a poor child, districts have an incentive to acquiesce to the more expensive requests of the former and to provide the
less expensive option to the latter, since the risk of a private enforcement action is greater with wealthier families.”).
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take their obligations to serve all children seriously, 65 though the due process hearing system is
still needed to deal with lapses and disagreements.
Many thoughtful writers who argue that people without means are at a disadvantage in
the due process system do not want to get rid of hearing rights. Instead, they would expand
remedies and supports to make it easier for poor parents to use the system. One article by a trio
of experts lists specifics such as creating emergency and interim hearing procedures,
strengthening notice, reinstating the right to expert witness fees, shifting the burden of proof to
school districts, reinstating the catalyst theory for attorneys’ fees, and increasing the number of
publicly funded lawyers. 66 Professor Colker does not propose reducing due process rights; on the
contrary, she supports provision of a free educational advocate for parents as soon as there is
reason to think their children may need special education. 67 Professor Chopp, who appears to
agree with some of the criticism concerning advocacy disparities, calls for increased public
enforcement of IDEA in addition to increased access to free and low-cost attorney services so
parents may make use of existing due process hearing and litigation rights. 68 Even Professor
Pasachoff has a “disinclination to eliminate private enforcement of the IDEA.” 69 Of serious
concern, however, is that legislators or others reading the critiques of due process will ignore

65

See Anne P. Dupre, Disability, Deference, and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REV. 393, 446
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caveats of that type. For example, the AASA paper cites Professor Pasachoff several times; 70 it
also cites Professor Rosenfeld several times, though he would retain due process hearing
remedies while adding an arbitration option. 71
2. Is the hearing system too costly for school districts? The AASA links the cost of
hearings, particularly the risk of having to pay parents’ attorneys’ fees and the lost time for
school personnel, to what it declares is the over-willingness of school districts to accede to
unjustified demands from parents for services for their children. 72 Impartial study of the costs
tells a different tale. One extensive multi-state study of hearings is a Government Accountability
Office investigation from 2003. Its title reflects its principal observation: Special Education:
Numbers of Formal Disputes Are Generally Low and States Are Using Mediation and Other
Strategies to Resolve Conflicts. 73 It reported a five-year decline in hearings held (even though
hearing requests increased during that period), and concluded, “Overall, dispute resolution
activity was generally low relative to the number of students with disabilities. About 5 due
process hearings were held per 10,000 students with disabilities.” 74 If districts are settling
disputes on the basis of anything other than predictions of actual outcomes at hearings, it would
seem that they are drastically miscalculating the likelihood that a hearing will in fact occur, much
less that the parents will prevail and the district will be liable for fees. 75 Since the time of the
GAO report, IDEA has been amended to discourage parental hearing requests by, among other
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things, making parents and their attorneys subject to liability for the district’s attorneys’ fees if
the request is found to be frivolous. 76 Not surprisingly, the latest data show a 10 percent decline
in hearing requests over the past seven years, and a 58% decline in hearings held. 77
Moreover, if the districts are concerned about hearing expenses and their side effects on
policy, they may—and do—buy insurance. As the AASA notes, “Many districts have insurance
plans through their state association or collective of state associations that may cover some of
their legal fees after the due process hearing once they reach their deductible.” 78
3. Parents never win, anyway? The urban legend is that parents very rarely win due
process hearings, and so taking away hearing rights would not matter. The premise of the
argument is simply false. Parents do win, and the rate of winning goes up dramatically when they
have attorney representation. 79 An Illinois study covering a five-year period showed a success
rate of 16.8 percent for parents without attorneys and 50.4 percent for those with attorneys. 80
Given that both clients and lawyers are likely to present multiple claims, some stronger or
weaker than others, success on one major issue should be considered success on the case as a
whole. The Illinois study defined it that way. 81 A study of hearings (both with attorney
76
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representation and without) in Iowa showed a parental success rate of 32 percent and mixed
results in additional 8 percent of cases. 82 Another study of 575 hearings in 41 states in 2005-06
gave the parental win rate of 30.4 percent and mixed results in another 10.4 percent. 83 The
student note criticizing due process procedures that was referred to above described a study of
hearings in Wisconsin and Minnesota from 2000 to 2011that showed that parents who were
represented by attorneys had a 13 percent win rate and a “split decision” rate of 23 percent. 84
Of equal importance, beneficial deterrent effects occur with regard to how school districts
serve other children, even though the parents do not always succeed, or succeed in a majority of
cases. Consider an analogy: The National Center for State Courts reports that the win rate at trial
for medical malpractice plaintiffs is only 23 percent, 85 yet the prospect of malpractice liability
increases the care with which medical providers behave. 86 One may be reluctant to make
comparisons to the criminal justice system, but it is worth noting that the win rate for criminal
defendants is extremely small. 87 Nevertheless, few Americans would advocate giving up the
right to a criminal trial. It seems obvious that the prospect of a criminal case going to trial before
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a neutral judge and jury makes the police and prosecutors more careful in making sure that the
person charged is indeed guilty. Tellingly, the AASA relies on the existence of deterrent effects
when it complains that school districts give in and provide services to avoid threatened due
process proceedings. 88 The AASA says that districts frequently accede to requests from parents
that they would not agree to but for the existence of due process. 89 This argument entails the
conclusion that the existence of the hearing right has a powerful effect.
Nonetheless, the AASA contends that:
There is no evidence demonstrating that successful challenges to an IEP in a due
process hearing lead to marked improvements in the academic performance of
students with disabilities or improvements to what the district was providing
students originally. No research proves that students who take advantage of
IDEA’s due process provisions fare better academically after undertaking the
hearing process. 90
Given the overall small numbers of children involved in hearings and absence of any
clear control group, it is difficult to imagine what kind of research the AASA is demanding. The
AASA could be contending that enhanced or different services than those offered by the district
caused no benefit to the child, though a researcher would be hard put to design a controlled
experiment that would be consistent with ethical practices that would test that hypothesis. Or it
could be contending that compensatory services or tuition reimbursement are no good for the
individuals who receive them, but that seems counterintuitive at best and in some instances
preposterous.
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4. Are hearing rights out of control? There are those who believe that the due process
system as originally conceived was a good thing, but that hearings have become too frequent, too
long, and too complicated. 91 This position too is dubious. As noted, in recent years the number of
hearings has declined significantly. 92 As a rule, hearings are also short: one state study
determined that 47 percent of hearings took one day or less, and 23 percent were decided with no
hearing at all. 93
That system can hardly be described as one that is out of control, but if the description
were accurate, there are means to fix it short of eliminating important due process protections.
One factor relative to the complexity of due process hearings that is readily subject to legal
reform is the judicial exhaustion rule. In special education cases, courts apply administrative
exhaustion requirements with vehemence. 94 Knowledgeable practitioners realize that if they fail
to completely develop an issue at due process, they will not be able to rely on it if the case goes
to court. Moreover, even if an issue has properly been raised at hearing, it is extremely difficult
to persuade judges hear new evidence on the issue when the case is on appeal to the district
court. 95 Obviously, some hearings become protracted due to poor presentation on one side or
both. But some, notably a locally famous 13-day hearing in Illinois, 96 become protracted because
highly skilled lawyers know the hearing is their only chance to build a record for appeal, and
91
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they want the record to be comprehensive. 97 Unfortunately, matters seem to have become worse,
not better, for the prospects of relaxation of exhaustion requirements. As an illustration, in a
2013 Eleventh Circuit case, the court insisted that every single claim presented by a set of facts
be raised and exhausted before it could properly be brought to court. 98
Some supposed reforms to IDEA have also increased complexity of hearings, and these
too should be undone if Congress wishes to undertake real reform. The pleading requirements
put in place in 2004 increase paperwork and promote delay. 99 Settlement procedures under
existing law, including IDEA’s offer of settlement rule, are ambiguous and have unintended
negative consequences. 100 In contrast, a few helpful steps have recently been taken to simplify
hearings, such as the trend in the states away from two tier (hearing and decision and then review
officer proceeding) systems to one-tier processes. 101 Better case management by means of
prehearing conferences and orders has led to more focused and quicker hearings, as has the
increasing professionalization of the corps of administrative law judges and independent hearing
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officers. 102 The AASA states that “the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA mandated that hearing
officers be lawyers.” 103 That is of course incorrect; but there is no doubt that hearing officers’
expertise in conducting hearings efficiently has increased over the years, and it was wise for
Congress to require in 2004 that hearing officers possess the knowledge and ability to understand
the law, to conduct hearings, and to render and write decisions. 104
IV. UNDERAPPRECIATED BENEFITS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM
One obvious argument in favor of the existing system is the perhaps tautological, but
critically important, point that due process hearings afford due process. Due process is
constitutionally required, and for good reason. Due process of law protects against arbitrary
governmental decisions, those that are made without allowing the persons affected to participate
or without following a consistent legal principle. 105 The interest at stake in IDEA cases is that of
families in the education of their children, as vital an interest as there is. The Supreme Court
declared in Brown v. Board of Education, “[Education] is the very foundation of good
citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.” 106 If by Rowley’s definition, what children
with disabilities are entitled to is access to education that is beneficial to them, the deprivation of
that access needs to be protected by adequate procedures. What those procedures should be has
been articulated in a line of due process cases stretching from before Goldberg v. Kelly, 107 which
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includes Goss v. Lopez, 108 and the right to education actions such as Mills and PARC. Those
cases demonstrate that adversary procedures are needed—and widely provided—in any number
of situations where citizens are dissatisfied with determinations that government actors make
concerning essential entitlements for individuals and families. 109 The adversary procedures
include a neutral decision maker 110 rendering a decision with a statement of reasons, as well as
the opportunity to compel attendance of witnesses and confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses. 111
Cases such as Mills and PARC presaged the procedural due process test articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge, a test that considers the importance of the individual interest affected; the
risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the probable value of additional safeguards; and
any countervailing governmental interests. 112 Applied to the entitlement to appropriate special
education services, the test requires hearing rights. Access to education is of critical importance;
adversary hearing procedures protect against a very real risk of deprivation; and, as this paper
seeks to demonstrate, existing hearing procedures represent a wise congressional determination
that any countervailing concerns do not prevail. In other words, due process hearing rights are

108

419 U.S. 565 (1975).
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 7.4 (2011) (collecting cases in
which hearing rights have found to be required by due process).
110
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that due process requires recusal of
judge who received significant campaign contributions from litigant); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927)
(requiring disinterested adjudicator in case involving imposition of minor fine).
111
See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (detailing hearing rights for revocation of parole);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (“In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions
of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”); see also id. at 27071 (requiring opportunity to be heard by counsel and statement of reasons by decision maker in welfare termination
hearing).
112
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Critics have charged that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of procedural due process
does not account for all of the concerns embodied in the constitutional clause. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28 (1976). This Article does not attempt to propose alternatives to
current procedural due process doctrine.
109

22

both crucial and constitutionally required. The label “due process hearing” is so familiar that one
forgets it embraces a correct conclusion of law.
The development of a body of precedent at the administrative level is another important
benefit of having due process hearing rights. 113 Precedents are established either locally or more
broadly when due process cases are adjudicated and appealed. It may be correct, as Professor
Pasachoff says, that many cases are unique and so lack general applicability, 114 but many other
cases fall into patterns—behavior intervention, least restrictive environment, specialized services
for children with autism, transportation, private placement, and so on. Within each of these
fields, administrative rulings and decisions on judicial review provide the body of law that
practitioners and adjudicators need for guidance in future cases. 115
The need to establish precedent through hearings and judicial review brings up an
additional important benefit of existing due process hearing procedures: they produce
comprehensive records for review in the courts. Imagine a federal judge trying to sort through
notes or a transcript of a freewheeling, informal discussion of a child’s needs and proposed
services, and trying to decide whether to allocate trial time to an evidentiary hearing to go over
everything again. 116
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V. PROBLEMS WITH THE ALTERNATIVES
The “trust us” approach of AASA is not a good one. It is not realistic to rely on school
districts to consistently behave in accordance with the law when they face budgetary and other
pressures. 117 Even if some districts do not face those pressures, or if greater costs are not an issue
in a given case, anyone who has ever worked in a school, or had significant dealings with one,
knows schools are vulnerable to the twin threats of standard operating procedure and entrenched
interests. 118
The alternatives of facilitated IEPs and special education consultancy proposed by AASA
are no substitute for existing hearing rights. Nothing in federal law forbids IEP facilitation, so it
is freely available to states. About half of states have IEP facilitation now, 119 so whatever gains it
provides are being realized already or are not perceived as worthwhile enough to support its
adoption. As the AASA concedes, IEP facilitation leaves the power over program and placement
with the school district. 120 Moreover, even if facilitation is currently successful, there is no
reason to believe that it will continue to be so without due process hearing rights to equalize the
bargaining power of the parent and the district.
The “independent, neutral special education consultant” proposed by the AASA is also an
unsatisfactory substitute for due process. As the AASA says, under its plan lawyers and
advocates cannot serve, 121 which creates a school-side power imbalance from the outset. If the
parties try to go to court after the consultant acts, there will be no usable record for review, no
117
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maintenance of placement, and no one will ever have developed the facts through crossexamination. The consultant merely has the ability to recommend obtaining additional
evaluations of the child, 122 and remedies are limited to revised IEPs, not reimbursement of
expenses or compensatory education, which, under the plan, only a court (or a voluntary
agreement by the school district) could provide. 123 True, “this system is considerably less
stressful for special education teachers, specialized instructional support staff and
administrators,” 124 but that is because it would be less effective as a means of enforcing the law.
If there has been any success with similar ideas in the past, there is no reason to expect it to work
once the option of due process is off the table.
Arbitration would eliminate critical protections of the law, most notably control over the
nature of the proceedings and scope of the evidence, and depending on the arbitration system
adopted, cost-free access, judicial review, and the availability of attorneys’ fees. 125 Due process
protections help to moderate the huge power disparity between school districts and parents.
Legal remedies are always an equalizer, and are essential to maintaining a just public order. 126
Mediation as an adjunct to due process has been successful, but it needs the threat of due
process to make it work. It is no surprise that diplomatic solutions may depend on the backstop
of coercion. The AASA proposal would actually diminish the effectiveness of mediation by
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barring attorneys, 127 thus again exacerbating the power inequality that parents face. The AASA
report also says, cryptically, that under its proposal “the mediation agreement is not legally
binding,” 128 which gives the school district the unilateral ability to revoke whatever agreement it
made. Careful observers of mandatory alternative dispute resolution processes note that, like
formal adjudication processes, these procedures tend to reflect power imbalances in favor of
repeat players. 129
Monitoring or other public enforcement, as favored by Professor Pasachoff, has its
merits, but parents lack any control over it, and the funding cutoff threat is so unrealistic that it
does not have much of a deterrent effect. As Professor Pasachoff says, “[E]ven though the
federal agency charged with IDEA enforcement repeatedly found states in violation of the IDEA,
it has almost never taken any formal action to withdraw funds, limiting its involvement to
negotiation and acceptance of minimal improvements.” 130 Professor Pasachoff’s suggestions for
strengthening public enforcement 131 may help, although it is difficult to say how politically
realistic they are in an anti-regulatory, anti-central government era. The AASA asserts that the
current monitoring system conducted by the U.S. Department of Education, combined with
enforcement of the No Child Left Behind law, is so effective as to eliminate the need for due
process, 132 but that position is hard to square with reality133 Curiously, although the AASA
seems to think that existing monitoring is an adequate substitute for due process, it concedes that
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“there is no correlation between the number of due process complaints filed by parents and the
number of findings by state or federal departments of education of noncompliance.” 134 That is
hardly surprising, for monitoring focuses on record-keeping and various technical compliance
indicators more than substantive compliance with appropriate education obligations.
The AASA says that enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the
Education Amendments relies on executive branch activity rather than individualized remedies
and entitlements, 135 but that is incorrect. 136 What is correct is that the Supreme Court eliminated
private judicial enforcement of Title VI disparate impact obligations in Alexander v. Sandoval. 137
Few informed observers think of that as a positive development for racial justice. 138
VI. SOME USEFUL REFORMS
The reforms that might aid enforcement of IDEA without incurring negative side effects
are modest procedural changes, only a few of which would demand new legislation. 139
1. Providing expert witness fees. Providing expert witness fees as a matter of course for
prevailing parents would equalize the position of the parties in due process disputes. 140
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Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (upholding Title VI claim) (lead op.).
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532 U.S. 275, 285-86 (2001) (rejecting interpretation of Title VI adopted in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974),
which upheld Title VI disparate impact claim).
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See, e.g., Adele P. Kimmel et al., The Sandoval Decision and Its Implications for Future Civil Rights
Enforcement, FLA. B.J., Jan., 2002, at 24, 26 (“[T]he Court's ruling in Sandoval does not prevent federal agencies
from bringing their own enforcement actions, which may include cutting off federal grants to programs that employ
policies or practices that have an unjustified disparate impact on minorities. As a practical matter, however, this fact
offers little solace to victims of discrimination because federal resources for enforcing Title VI and its regulations
are limited. [FN15] Indeed, during the Clinton administration, the United States filed a brief in Sandoval stating that
“private enforcement provides a necessary supplement to government enforcement” of Title VI and its
implementing regulations.”) (footnotes omitted); Derek Black, Comment, Picking Up the Pieces After Alexander v.
Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356, 357 (2002)
(“Sandoval has closed a door that was once essential to ensuring the enforcement of civil rights legislation and
providing equal opportunity to people of all races and ethnicities.”); Melanie K. Gross, Note, Invisible Shackles:
Alexander v. Sandoval and the Compromise to the Medical Civil Rights Movement, 47 HOW. L.J. 943, 947 (2004)
(describing Sandoval as “severe blow” to medical civil rights).
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A catalog of reforms that are somewhat more ambitious than those discussed here is found in Hyman et al., supra
note __, at 155-61.
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Moreover, it would not necessarily increase number of hearings. In cases where the experts on
both sides agree—a situation that happens more than might be expected—settlements typically
ensue. When that does not occur, a more convincing expert presentation by one side or the other
may well induce the other side to give in. This reform would require legislation to overrule the
Supreme Court ruling that IDEA did not permit expert fees, but that prospect is hardly
unrealistic. Congress passed a similar amendment restoring expert fees under the Civil Rights
Attorneys Fees Act and Title VII. 141
2. Relaxing exhaustion and new-evidence rules. The proposal would actually not be to
relax the rules, but to restore what appears to have been Congress’s intent regarding exhaustion.
Senator Paul Simon, a sponsor the 1986 Handicapped Children’s Protection Act, the law that
codified IDEA’s exhaustion requirement and applied to selected claims under other provisions,
described a broad set of situations in which IDEA does not require exhaustion:
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See Leslie Reed, Comment, Is A Free Appropriate Public Education Really Free? How the Denial of Expert
Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children with Autism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 251, 299 (2008) (“While some
parents will not be dissuaded from pursuing an IDEA lawsuit by the inability to recover expert fees, many parents of
children with [autism spectrum disorder] will not have such an opportunity because they will not have the financial
backing to fund an expert.”); see also Allan G. Osborne, Jr., & Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court Rejects
Parental Reimbursement for Expert Witness Fees Under the IDEA: Arlington Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy, 213 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 333, 348 (2006) (“Arlington clearly appears to shift the balance of
power to school boards by denying reimbursements to parents for the costs of expert witnesses, thereby possibly
limiting parental access to such important help in protecting the educational rights of their children with
disabilities.”)
141
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), which
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1988’s provision of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in civil rights cases did not include
expert witness fees. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat, 1071, 1079. Responding to
widespread criticism of Casey, see, e.g., Eileen R. Kaufman, Choosing the Insidious Path: West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey and the Importance of Experts in Civil Rights Litigation, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 57 (1991), Congress provided for expert witness fees for prevailing parties in cases under the
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2006), and Title VII, see id. § 2000e-3(k). But
because Casey explicitly distinguished the fees provision in IDEA from § 1988 and noted the congressional
intention to have expert witness fees included in IDEA fees awards, Casey, 499 U.S. at 91 n.5, Congress had no
reason to change IDEA. Then the Court decided Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291 (2006), applying Casey’s interpretation of unamended § 1988 to IDEA and eliminating expert fees in
IDEA cases. A congressional effort to overturn Casey failed several years ago. See S. 613, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (both unenacted).
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It is important to note that there are certain situations in which it is not appropriate
to require the exhaustion of EHA administrative remedies before filing a civil law
suit. These include complaints that: First, an agency has failed to provide services
specified in the child's individualized educational program (IEP); second, an
agency has abridged or denied a handicapped child's procedural rights-for
example, failure to implement required procedures concerning least restrictive
environment or convening of meetings; three, an agency had adopted a policy or
pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law, or where it
would otherwise be futile to use the due process procedures-for example, where
the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought; and four, an
emergency situation exists-for example, failure to provide services during the
pendency of proceedings, or a complaint concerning summer school placement
which would not likely be resolved in time for the student to take advantage of the
program. 142
As noted above, courts are in fact applying a more draconian regime. 143 Courts should also be
more faithful to IDEA’s text regarding new evidence on appeal. 144
3. Continuing to streamline due process proceedings. This reform could be achieved by
discouraging elaborate motion practice, holding prehearing conferences to clarify the dispute,
and seizing every opportunity to minimize procedure while still affording ample opportunity to
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See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (2006) (“In any action brought under this paragraph, the court— . . . shall hear
additional evidence at the request of a party.”) (emphasis added). But see, e.g., West Platte R-11 Sch. Dist. v.
Wilson, 439 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding district court refusal to permit supplementation of
administrative record).
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be heard. 145 Continued movement by states to one-tier hearing systems should also reduce the
ponderousness of the system and eliminate unnecessary second-guessing.
4. Continuing efforts to enhance professionalism and training of independent hearing
officers and administrative law judges. Hearing decisions receive significant deference when
reviewed by courts. 146 To justify the deference, the decision makers need to have expertise and
professionalism. Hearing officers and administrative law judges should receive education not
only on legal issues, but also on the substance of special education and educational assessment:
what works when, what is trending, and how to evaluate expert opinions. 147
5. Strengthening enforcement of settlements when enforcement is appropriate. This step
is important so that parties do not refuse to settle for fear that the settlement will not be obeyed.
Unfortunately, the consequences that ensue when a party reneges on a settlement are anything
but predictable. 148 Some relatively simple steps, such as ensuring federal jurisdiction for suits to
enforce private settlements of due process hearings, and clarifying that no exhaustion is required
for those cases, would increase the certainty that settlements will stick and strengthen the
incentives to settle. 149
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proceedings, mindful that we lack the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve questions of
educational policy. It is not for the federal court to choose between the views of conflicting experts on such
questions.”) (citations and internal quotations and alterations omitted).
147
See Rosenfeld, supra note __ [It’s Time], at 551 (“Many hearing officers are faced with the obligation to decide
between proposals that they are not well trained to evaluate. Moreover, because of fears of being perceived as
partial, many believe themselves handcuffed in asking for or requiring additional information from either of the
parties that they suspect may be important, if not crucial, in deciding the case before them.”).
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See Weber, supra note __ [Settling], at 654-66.
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Id. at 663-64.
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CONCLUSION
To borrow one of Professor Colker’s favorite words, 150 the appropriate conclusion for
this paper is, “Don’t dis due process.” The system of due process hearing rights for parents under
IDEA is indeed under attack, but due process rights are worth defending. Due process hearings
afford protections to parents and children that will be missed sorely if they are lost. Moreover,
with some modest improvements, the due process hearing system could be even more effective
at guaranteeing that children receive the education owed them under law.
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